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THE VACUITY OF WILKES
BENJAMIN MEANS*
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, corporate governance remains mostly a
matter of state law.1 Accordingly, to understand how a court will
resolve a claim of minority shareholder oppression in a closely held
corporation, we have to know which state’s law applies.2 Depend
ing upon where a business has been incorporated, any of fifty differ
ent legal regimes will govern the rights and obligations of its
shareholders and other stakeholders.3
However, too much attention to differences among states may
cause us to lose sight of common themes in shareholder oppression
law. As an initial matter, the basic definition of a close corporation
is substantially similar across jurisdictions—a limited number of
shareholders, an absence of publicly traded shares, and, typically,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law; A.B.,
Dartmouth College, J.D., Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Jim Burkhard, Lisa
Fairfax, Matt Hall, Susan Kuo, and Doug Moll for their comments and suggestions and
to Alina Dudau and Richard Simons for their research assistance. An earlier version of
this Article was presented as part of the 2010 Southeast Association of Law Schools
New Scholars program, and I have benefited also from the views of my fellow Sympo
sium participants.
1. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 668 (1974) (describing competition among states for corpo
rate charters, with Delaware the clear winner). Some scholars have called for increased
federal oversight of corporate law rules. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism
and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1499-1508 (1992); see also Richard A. Booth, The Fall and Rise of
Federal Corporation Law, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 161, 161 (2007) (“It is quite remarkable
that corporation law remains the province of the states.” (emphasis omitted)).
2. In general, shareholder oppression law “attempts to safeguard the close corpo
ration minority investor from the improper exercise of majority control.” Douglas K.
Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close Corporation, 60 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 841, 844 (2003) [hereinafter Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend
Policy].
3. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to
Minority Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 700–09 (2007)
(surveying the law of all fifty states). As Matheson and Maler observe, “[e]ach state has
a unique regime for addressing minority shareholder oppression in closely held busi
nesses—a surprising state of affairs for such an important area of corporate law.” Id. at
661.
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direct shareholder involvement in management.4 Minority share
holders in close corporations, unlike their counterparts in public
corporations, have little practical ability to exit and to recover the
value of their investment.5 Consequently, minority shareholders
are particularly vulnerable to mistreatment by controlling share
holders.6 The problem of shareholder oppression follows from
these basic features of the close corporation form.7
Not surprisingly, given the shared dimensions of the problem,
states have developed similar legal responses that can be grouped
into representative categories.8 In some states, for instance, op
pression is couched in the language of tort law: whether the major
ity shareholders acted “harshly and wrongfully” toward the
minority.9 Elsewhere, courts ask whether the minority sharehold
ers have been deprived of the benefit of their contractual bargain.10
Other courts take a “fiduciary approach” to claims of oppression
and insist that shareholders in close corporations are essentially
partners who owe each other stronger fiduciary obligations than
corporate law would ordinarily require.11
4. See 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS
LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1:2, 1:9 (rev. 3d ed. 2010).
5. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993) (noting that
“there is no market and no market valuation”); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328
N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975) (“In a large public corporation, the oppressed or dissident
minority stockholder could sell his stock in order to extricate some of his invested capi
tal. By definition, this market is not available for shares in the close corporation.”).
6. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513 (“The minority is vulnerable to a variety of op
pressive devices, termed ‘freezeouts,’ which the majority may employ.”).
7. Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minor
ity Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1218 (2009)
[hereinafter Means, A Voice-Based Framework].
8. See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The
Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 754 (2000) [hereinafter
Moll, The Unanswered Question of Perspective] (contending that “majority and minor
ity perspectives” give us a method for sorting state approaches to oppression).
9. See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression,
48 BUS. LAW. 699, 711–12 (1993) [hereinafter Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of
Action for Oppression] (“Some courts describe oppression as ‘burdensome, harsh and
wrongful conduct . . . a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a viola
tion of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is
entitled to rely.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d
351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976))).
10. For a narrow version of this contractual approach, see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626
A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993), contending that it is incumbent upon minority sharehold
ers to negotiate for explicit contractual protections and that there is no role for courts
to create additional, “special” protections.
11. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. Although breach of fiduciary duty may also
be tortious, this Article contends that much of the animating force of fiduciary duty can
be understood in contractual terms. For further discussion of contract law and share
AND
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Yet, broad categories can mislead. Individual state approaches
to shareholder oppression have distinct characteristics; even when
identical terms are used, they may have different meanings. Fiduci
ary duty, for instance, is a famously varied concept,12 and notewor
thy differences exist from state to state regarding the scope of the
duty, available defenses, and appropriate remedies.13 The danger
of relying upon analytic categories—a generic “fiduciary ap
proach,” for one—is that we will oversimplify, leaving out impor
tant doctrinal details and nuances. If we hope to evaluate
shareholder oppression law, we must first understand how courts
actually resolve claims of shareholder oppression.
This Symposium offers a welcome corrective to reliance on
general categories, inviting us to reflect critically upon the thirtyfive-year legacy of a leading Massachusetts case, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.14 The venerable Wilkes decision is ideally
suited to serve as a focal point for evaluation of shareholder op
pression law.15 Wilkes defines the Massachusetts approach to
shareholder oppression, and Massachusetts has had an indelible in
fluence on the development of a robust, fiduciary-based response to

holder oppression, see Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Op
pression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161 (2010) [hereinafter Means, A Contractual
Approach]; see also Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Con
tracts: Is the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1073
(2001) [hereinafter Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts] (“[I]t is
fair to assert that oppression law is doing what contract law should be doing if contract
law took a broader perspective when identifying and enforcing bargains.”); Robert B.
Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. L. 377, 394
(1990) (“A close corporation is like a long-term relational contract in which benefits for
all parties necessarily depend on unstated assumptions. A fully contingent contract
cannot be drafted, so some ex post settling up by courts is used to support these as
sumptions.” (footnote omitted)).
12. See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (“Fiduciary obligation is one of the most elusive
concepts in Anglo-American law.”).
13. Even Delaware, which has refused to recognize “special” protections for mi
nority shareholders in close corporations, places a fiduciary duty on controlling share
holders that requires them to demonstrate the entire fairness of any self-dealing
transactions. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 822
(2002) (noting that under Delaware law “standard corporate law fiduciary duty princi
ples constrain the conduct of both directors and controlling shareholders”).
14. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
15. The Westlaw database reflects, as of October 6, 2010, that Wilkes has been
cited 776 times. KEYCITE CITING REFERENCES: Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home,
Inc., Westlaw, www.westlaw.com (search for Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,
353 N.E.2d 657 and following the “Citing References” link) (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
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shareholder oppression nationwide.16 Just as the study of public
corporations often begins with Delaware corporate law, Massachu
setts law frames the analysis of shareholder oppression in closely
held corporations.17 Even jurisdictions that reject the fiduciary ap
proach to shareholder oppression must engage with it,18 and Wilkes
represents the most prominent and most complete statement of the
fiduciary approach.
Wilkes was decided only a year after the Massachusetts Su
preme Judicial Court first held, in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co.,19 that “stockholders in the close corporation owe one another
substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enter
prise that partners owe to one another.”20 To meet the required
standard, according to Donahue, shareholders must treat each
other with the “utmost good faith and loyalty.”21 The Wilkes court
recognized that Donahue’s absolutist formulation, although appeal
ing rhetorically, needs clarification.22
Unfortunately, Wilkes does not deliver the guidance it
promises. Wilkes instead offers a list of competing considerations.
We are told that controlling shareholders “may not act out of ava
rice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loy
alty to the other stockholders”23 but that they “concededly, have
certain rights to what has been termed ‘selfish ownership’ in the
corporation” and that these inconsistent concepts must be “bal
anced.”24 So far, for better or worse, Wilkes provides an ordinary,
common law standard through which courts might attempt to rec
16. See, e.g., Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 468-70 (5th Cir. 2000); G & N Aircraft,
Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 240 (Ind. 2001); Moore v. Me. Indus. Servs., Inc., 645
A.2d 626, 628 (Me. 1994); Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 370 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000); Long v. Atl. PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 256 n.8 (R.I. 1996).
17. Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Cor
porations, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 1099, 1099–1101 (1999).
18. Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 (Del. 1996); Lerner v. Lerner
Corp., 750 A.2d 709, 721 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
19. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505
(Mass. 1975).
20. Id. at 515 (footnotes omitted).
21. Id.
22. Unless controlling shareholders must run the corporation in the best interests
of the minority shareholders, regardless of their own needs and interests, the fiduciary
duty of loyalty cannot be one of entire selflessness. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) (expressing “concern[ ] that untempered
application of the strict good faith standard enunciated in Donahue . . . will result in the
imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group”).
23. Id. at 662.
24. Id. at 663.
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oncile competing values.25 The court, though, fails to adequately
explain the key concepts it identifies.
The court held that controlling shareholders may act in ways
that disadvantage minority owners, if the controlling group can
show a “legitimate business purpose,” and if the minority cannot
establish a less harmful option that would achieve that purpose.26
However, the court neither made clear what counts as “legitimate”
nor how close an approximation the minority’s less-harmful option
must represent.27 Also, without explaining the relevance of share
holder expectations to its standard, the court observed that adverse
action could “frustrate the minority stockholder’s purposes in en
tering . . . the corporate venture.”28 The court’s two-part balancing
test leaves the most important questions unanswered. In short, the
Wilkes test is vacuous.
And yet, if Wilkes has correctly identified the values at stake in
a shareholder-oppression case, and if those values really do conflict
with each other, what methodology would better reconcile them?29
How would we improve upon Wilkes? Unless we can appeal to
some overarching principle when the minority’s interests are jeop
ardized by the pursuit of otherwise legitimate business purposes, we
cannot claim that such disputes have a single, correct answer.30 Ac
ceptable reasons could be adduced for any outcome. Still, courts
must in the end decide cases, vindicating certain values at the ex
pense of others. The binary structure of legal decision-making re
quires a result—either the majority has oppressed the minority
under the relevant legal standard, or it has not.
25.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN AN
LEGAL COMMUNITY, 1870-1930 39 (1987) (“The common law is not a
body of rules; it is a method. It is the creation of law by the inductive process.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
27. Id. (“If called on to settle a dispute, our courts must weigh the legitimate
business purpose, if any, against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.”).
28. Id.
29. As Professor Larry Ribstein observes, by incorporating the parties in Wilkes
created “the structural dissonance of a ‘partnership’ in corporate form.” Larry E. Ribstein, Close Corporation Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm, 33 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 531 (2011).
30. The difficulty I am describing is by no means unique to shareholder oppres
sion doctrine. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Hiding the Ball, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1681, 1682
(1996) (identifying conflicting constitutional interpretations and stating that “one could
repeat this exercise in the plurality of legal meaning with just about any interesting
piece of common or statutory law”).
GLO-AMERICAN
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Given the constraints of the judicial role, Wilkes deserves
credit for resisting the temptation to simplify shareholder oppres
sion disputes, even if its time-honored legal response—the deploy
ment of a balancing metaphor—leaves too many issues under
explored.31 This Article contends that a more developed theory of
reasonable expectations would help clarify the Wilkes approach by
offering an appropriate threshold inquiry. To decide whether a mi
nority shareholder’s expectation is reasonable, courts should ask
whether there exists a shared understanding among shareholders
(even if unwritten and unspoken) that the majority has violated.32
A contractual approach to shareholder oppression, building on
Wilkes’s acknowledgment of the importance of reasonable share
holder expectations,33 would advance the task Wilkes set for itself:
the articulation of a powerful but fair standard for protecting mi
nority shareholders that does not prevent controlling shareholders
from pursuing legitimate business purposes.34
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I argues that Wilkes
fails to provide a clear standard for assessing claims of shareholder
31. In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Lyman Johnson notes that
Wilkes’s approach is consistent with the methodology courts have long used to resolve
disputes concerning our most fundamental values. See Lyman Johnson, Enduring Eq
uity in the Close Corporation, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 313 (2011) (“Balancing, of
course, is a longstanding mainstay of constitutional law analysis, where competing inter
ests are weighed against each other and the relative strengths of each are assessed.”).
32. In many disputes, asking what the shareholders’ actual bargain was will go a
long way toward determining whether there has been a breach of fiduciary duty. See,
e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Mass. 1996). However, not all
claims of shareholder oppression turn on the nature of the parties’ bargain; the majority
can abuse its control even as to matters entirely beyond the parties’ contemplation. One
might still consider what the parties would have bargained for had they considered the
issue, but “[h]ypothetical contract is a welfare norm asserted by an academic. It is not a
transactional artifact.” William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Con
tractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 180, 192 (1992).
33. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664. Massachusetts courts have increasingly used ex
pectations analysis. See infra Part III.C.
34. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. Fiduciary duty and contractual norms are (or
can be) related concepts. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION
166 (2010) (“[C]ontrolling shareholders should not have fiduciary duties to noncontrol
ling shareholders . . . . [T]he law need only constrain opportunism by holding the con
troller to its express or implied contractual obligations, including the duty of good
faith . . . .”); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & JEFFREY M. LIPSHAW, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
ENTITIES 219 (4th ed. 2009) (“Fiduciary and good faith duties may be difficult to distin
guish in practice.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and
Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel,
Contract and Fiduciary Duty] (“[A] ‘fiduciary’ relation is a contractual one character
ized by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring. The duty of loyalty re
places detailed contractual terms . . . .”).
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oppression. Part II uses the facts of Donahue to illustrate Wilkes’s
indeterminacy. Part III contends that the Massachusetts courts,
even with the benefit of more than three decades of experience,
have not satisfactorily answered the questions that Wilkes left open.
Part IV contends that reasonable expectations analysis could give
the Wilkes test more specific content by encouraging the courts to
evaluate the legitimacy of the controlling shareholders’ purpose in
the context of the parties’ actual bargain.35 Part V concludes, how
ever, that not all values at stake in a shareholder oppression claim
are contractual. Wilkes’s engagement with complexity is a signal
contribution.
I. THE ROAD

TO

WILKES

Most jurisdictions protect minority shareholders from oppres
sion,36 notwithstanding the opposition of commentators who fault
shareholders who failed to negotiate adequately before investing.37
Some courts use common law doctrines to protect minority share
holders;38 elsewhere, there are specific statutory provisions in the
35. Unlike the you-made-your-bed-now-you-must-lie-in-it approach advocated by
some scholars, see, for example, Paula J. Dalley, The Misguided Doctrine of Stock
holder Fiduciary Duties, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 175 (2004), this kind of contractual analy
sis would take account of the parties’ ongoing relationship and the necessary
incompleteness of any long-term contract. See Means, A Contractual Approach, supra
note 11. At the same time, the analysis would require something more than “the minority’s reasonable expectations of benefit from their ownership of shares.” Brodie v. Jor
dan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006) (finding liability without inquiring as to
whether minority shareholder had any specific expectation with respect to the matter at
issue—that the corporation would provide a valuation of its shares at its own expense).
36. Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression and the Limited Liability Company:
Learning (or not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 883
(2005) (“[J]udicial precedents and statutory provisions in many jurisdictions afford
some protection to the close corporation minority investor from the improper exercise
of majority control.”); see also Sandra K. Miller, Should the Definition of Oppressive
Conduct by Majority Shareholders Exclude a Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Bus
iness Purpose?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 227 (1993) (“Many states have adopted remedial leg
islation to address the special needs of the minority shareholder of a closely-held
corporation.” (footnote omitted)).
37. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 830 (“[P]arties who want liberal dissolution rights may bargain for them . . . before investing.”); Edward B. Rock &
Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority
Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 915 (1999) (“[T]he question [is]
what, if anything, the courts should do for the minority shareholders in cases where the
parties have not provided for the problem by contract. Our basic answer is that courts
should not do anything except enforce the participants’ contracts and vigorously pre
vent non pro rata distributions to shareholders.” (footnote omitted)).
38. See Matheson & Maler, supra note 3, at 662 (noting that “some states have
developed relief for minority oppression as a matter of common law jurisprudence”).

R

R
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corporate code that enable oppressed shareholders to seek dissolu
tion as a remedy.39 At the heart of the Massachusetts common law
approach to shareholder oppression is the view that shareholders
owe each other a fiduciary duty of loyalty akin to that owed by
partners. Part I.A contends that the fiduciary approach, first articu
lated in Donahue, appeared to nullify the majority’s ability to make
necessary business decisions. Part I.B shows that the court’s effort
in Wilkes to better define the parameters of fiduciary duty was a
mixed success, limiting the reach of fiduciary duty at the expense of
the doctrine’s internal coherence.
A. The Duty of Utmost Good Faith and Loyalty
In Donahue, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court de
scribed the minority shareholder’s predicament.40 Under basic
rules of corporate law, the majority shareholders elect the board of
directors.41 In turn, the directors have the power to decide whether
value will be returned to shareholders through dividends and who
will be employed by the business.42 These powers can be used to
freeze out minority shareholders, so that they receive no benefit
from their stock ownership.43 Unlike their public corporation
39. See id. at 665-69 (describing evolution of the statutory approach to share
holder oppression). Depending on the jurisdiction, the dissolution statute may also give
courts the flexibility to award other kinds of equitable relief. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
14A:12-7(1)(c) (West 2003) (authorizing equitable remedies short of dissolution).
40. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975). The
court held that “a close corporation [is] typified by: (1) a small number of stockholders;
(2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder
participation in the management . . . of the corporation.” Id.
41. DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, THE LAW OF CLOSELY HELD
CORPORATIONS § 3.01, at 3-3 (2009) (“According to [the traditional model of corporate
governance], shareholders vote for directors but otherwise have little role in managing
the corporation.”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.05 (1984).
42. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 192–94 (“Under all corporation statutes, the
board of directors is the key player in the formal decisionmaking structure.”); MOLL &
RAGAZZO, supra note 41, § 7.01[A], at 7-4 (“Traditionally, most corporate power is
centralized in the hands of a board of directors.”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01(b).
43. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 514. An authoritative study of such “freeze-outs”
enumerates some of the possibilities:
“The squeezers [those who employ the freeze-out techniques] may refuse to
declare dividends; they may drain off the corporation’s earnings in the form of
exorbitant salaries and bonuses to the majority shareholder-officers and per
haps to their relatives, or in the form of high rent by the corporation for prop
erty leased from majority shareholders . . . ; they may deprive minority
shareholders of corporate offices and of employment by the company . . . .”
Id. at 513 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting F.H. O’NEAL & J. DER
WIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, 42 (1961)).

R
R
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counterparts, minority shareholders in close corporations are
locked in with no practical ability to exit by selling their shares and
investing elsewhere.44
The court further reasoned that a close corporation often re
sembles a partnership45 and that the stockholders in a close corpo
ration “‘clothe’ their partnership ‘with the benefits peculiar to a
corporation, limited liability, perpetuity and the like.’”46 There
fore, to address the problem of shareholder oppression, the court
imported partnership concepts into corporate law for the protection
of minority shareholders.47 While shareholders in corporations do
not ordinarily owe one another fiduciary duties, the Donahue court
held that shareholders in close corporations owe a fiduciary duty of
“utmost good faith and loyalty.”48
According to the court, the majority shareholders violated
their fiduciary duty because they refused to repurchase the shares
of a minority shareholder on the same terms made available to a
former majority shareholder who wished to retire.49 Euphemia
Donahue, the plaintiff, was the widow of a former vice president of
the corporation and a minority shareholder.50 The former majority
shareholder had already given the bulk of his stock to his children,
and they caused the corporation to repurchase the remaining stock
in connection with his resignation as a director.51 The court held
44. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 37, at 916; Thompson, The Shareholder’s
Cause of Action for Oppression, supra note 9, at 699 (observing that minority shareholders are “vulnerable in a way that is distinct from the risk faced by investors in
public corporations”). In a close corporation, there is no active secondary market for
stock, making it more difficult to locate a willing buyer and to ascertain the market
value. An outside investor will hesitate to accept a minority position in a corporation
owned by strangers, especially if it appears that shareholder relations have broken
down. See Paul G. Mahoney, Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations, in CON
CENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 177, 180 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000) (observing
that a minority shareholder “may sell to a third party, of course, but, if his desire to exit
stems from opportunistic behavior by the minority, the purchase price will reflect the
behavior and therefore provide neither recompense nor deterrence”).
45. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512 (“Just as in a partnership, the relationship among
the stockholders must be one of trust, confidence and absolute loyalty if the enterprise
is to succeed.”).
46. Id. (quoting In re Surchin v. Approved Bus. Mach. Co., 286 N.Y.S.2d 580, 581
(Sup. Ct. 1967)).
47. Id. at 515.
48. Id. at 515, 518.
49. Id. at 520. The corporation had repurchased the shares of a departing stock
holder, negotiated in connection with his departure from the business and his transfer
of control to his children. Id. at 511.
50. Id. at 508.
51. Id. at 510.

R
R
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that “if the stockholder whose shares were purchased was a mem
ber of the controlling group, the controlling stockholders must
cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportu
nity to sell a ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an
identical price.”52
Under the Donahue rule of equal opportunity, it does not mat
ter if the corporation has a good reason for repurchasing only some
of its outstanding stock.53 Nor does it matter whether the minority
had any bargained-for expectation of selling its stock to the corpo
ration at fair value.54 According to one commentator, “Donahue
used language so broad as to imply that the majority must always
subordinate their interests to those of the minority.”55
The Donahue court distinguished its approach from the “some
what less stringent standard of fiduciary duty to which directors and
stockholders of all corporations must adhere in the discharge of
their corporate responsibilities.”56 In an effort to describe “[t]he
more rigorous duty of partners and participants in a joint adven
ture,” the court quoted extensively from Justice Cardozo’s famous
articulation of fiduciary duty in Meinhard v. Salmon:
“Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms
of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. . . .
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensi
tive, is then the standard of behavior.”57

However, strict fiduciary duties create a dilemma: in a corpora
tion, let alone in a partnership, it is hard to know what “the punc
tilio of an honor the most sensitive” requires when difficult business
decisions must be made.58 Without the ability to adapt to unfore
seen circumstances, a business cannot survive; without the right to
52. Id. at 518.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 515 (“When the minority stockholder agrees to sell out at less than fair
value, the majority has won.”).
55. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 818; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death
of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1688 (1990) (“The
application of strict fiduciary standards to close corporations deprives controlling share
holders of the ability to manage the corporation—to use their own property—as they
see fit.”).
56. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 516 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (alter
ation in original)).
58. Id. (quoting Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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benefit from ownership, investors would have no incentive to take a
controlling stake in a business venture.
Commentators were quick to identify the vagueness inherent
in the Donahue approach to fiduciary duty. As the editors of the
Harvard Law Review noted in a review of recent cases for 1975
1976:
The court’s exhortation makes it clear that Massachusetts courts
can be expected to supervise more carefully at least some busi
ness decisions of close corporations; but which decisions those
may be cannot readily be determined because of the abstract na
ture of the court’s announced principle.59

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged this
criticism, and, as discussed in the next section, the court responded
in Wilkes by more carefully describing its views concerning the na
ture of fiduciary duty.60
B. The Legitimate Business Purposes of Selfish Owners
The facts set forth in Wilkes are straightforward: four equal
shareholders owned and operated a nursing home, all were found
ing investors, all shared profits equally through salary and divided
work responsibilities evenly.61 After a falling out, three of the
shareholders decided to fire the fourth, Wilkes, and to keep the
value of the investment for themselves.62 No messy family compli
cations were involved, and the court does not mention any offset
ting bad behavior on the part of the minority shareholder.63
Further augmenting the aura of disloyalty is the fact that Wilkes
59. Recent Cases: Corporations—Close Corporations—Stockholders’ Duty of “Ut
most Good Faith and Loyalty” Requires Controlling Shareholder Selling a Close Corpo
ration its Own Shares to Cause the Corporation to Offer to Purchase a Ratable Number
of Shares from Minority—Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1295,
328 N.E.2d 505 (1975), 89 HARV. L. REV. 423, 428 (1976) [hereinafter Recent Cases].
60. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976)
(“Therefore, when minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit against the
majority alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty owed to them by the majority, we
must carefully analyze the action taken by the controlling stockholders in the individual
case.”). Wilkes does not address the further criticism “that a relationship of ‘trust and
confidence’ does not in fact exist in all corporations that are closely held” and that
“imposition of a citizenship concept may be contrary to the intentions of the sharehold
ers.” Recent Cases, supra note 59, at 427-28.
61. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659-60.
62. Id. at 661.
63. Indeed, the falling out seems to have involved Wilkes’s negotiation of a better
deal for the business, limiting a co-owner’s ability to self-deal. See id. at 660 (“Wilkes
was successful in prevailing on the other stockholders of Springside to procure a higher
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devised the plan for a nursing-home business, and he brought the
other three shareholders on board as investors and participants;
they had shut him out of a business that would not have existed
without his efforts and creative vision.64
Given those facts, the court might have applied Donahue’s “ut
most good faith and loyalty” test and concluded without much
trouble that terminating the employment of the person who
founded the business, and who continued to do his part, falls well
short of the required standard of utmost loyalty.65 Instead, al
though the court reaffirmed Donahue,66 it also took the opportu
nity to clarify the fiduciary duty standard. The court acknowledged
a “concern[ ] that untempered application of the strict good faith
standard” might “unduly hamper” the majority’s ability to manage
the business and stated that “[t]he majority, concededly, have cer
tain rights to what has been termed ‘selfish ownership’ in the
corporation.”67
Specifically, in order to “temper” the application of good faith,
Wilkes invented a two-part test that balances the majority’s right of
selfish ownership “against . . . their fiduciary obligation to the mi
nority.”68 The Wilkes test first asks “whether the controlling group
can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action.”69
sale price for the property than Quinn apparently anticipated paying or desired to
pay.”).
64. Id. at 659. This is a recurring issue for venture capital financing. See Robert
Sprague & Karen L. Page, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Entre
preneur: Protecting Naive Issuers from Sophisticated Investors, 8 WYO. L. REV. 167, 167
(2008) (“There is evidence suggesting . . . that in the sphere of new ventures, the bal
ance of power may be tipped in favor of the investors and away from the issuers. In
deed, it is often the case that entrepreneurs, though expert in their substantive field,
tend to be naı̈ve in financial and business matters. Investors, particularly venture capi
talists, on the other hand, tend to be experienced and knowledgeable in financial
matters.”).
65. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 818 (“Under Donahue, this is an easy
case.”). The fact that an individual is a founding shareholder does not guarantee em
ployment, however, particularly where the parties have explicitly contracted for a dif
ferent arrangement. See M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor
Company: Everything Old is New Again, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 46 (J. Mark
Ramseyer ed., 2009) (“A good product can survive mismanagement precisely because
investors have control rights that give them the power to change management, even
when the manager is the entrepreneur without whom the company would not even
exist.”).
66. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661-62.
67. Id. at 663.
68. Id. (citing Alfred Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REV. 986,
1013-15 (1957)).
69. Id.
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Then, if the majority meets its burden, “it is open to minority stock
holders to demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could
have been achieved through an alternative course of action less
harmful to the minority’s interest.”70 The court’s role is to “weigh
the legitimate business purpose, if any, against the practicability of
a less harmful alternative.”71
Central to Wilkes’s analytic framework is the requirement that
controlling shareholders demonstrate a “legitimate business pur
pose” for challenged conduct that disadvantages minority share
holders.72 The Wilkes court did not offer a definition but
“acknowledge[d] the fact that the controlling group in a close cor
poration must have some room to maneuver in establishing the bus
iness policy of the corporation.”73 As examples, the court
mentioned business decisions concerning dividends, salary, and
employment.74
Applying this standard, the court found that there was no legit
imate business purpose for terminating Wilkes and that “[t]he sev
erance of Wilkes from the payroll resulted not from misconduct or
neglect of duties, but because of the personal desire of [his fellow
shareholders] to prevent him from continuing to receive money
from the corporation.”75 Because the majority lacked a legitimate
business purpose, there was no need to consider alternatives to the
minority shareholder’s termination.76 Of crucial importance for the
court was the fact that the majority’s actions “assured that Wilkes
would receive no return at all from the corporation.”77 Thus,
Wilkes set forth a novel approach to evaluating claims of minority
shareholder oppression, but it did so in a case involving facts that
did not require the court to reach the second step of its own
analysis.
Wilkes fails to explain what makes a business purpose legiti
mate, leaving even the first step’s application uncertain in future
cases. For instance, can there be a business purpose for terminating
the minority’s employment based on personal or family disagree
ments? One might interpret Wilkes to hold that shareholder per
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 661.
See id. at 663-64.
Id. at 664.
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sonality conflicts do not warrant adverse actions against a minority
shareholder, unless the minority shareholder intends to damage the
business through disruptive conduct.78 On the other hand, person
ality disputes can interfere with normal business operations as
much as any other conflict; squabbling shareholders can cripple a
corporation even if no shareholder desires that result and all share
holders seek only to advance their own view of how best to advance
the business.79
The remainder of the Wilkes test also lacks specific content.
Courts are instructed to balance business purposes with alternative
courses of action but are given no guidance in identifying reasona
ble alternatives or in assigning weights to different possible courses
of action.80 Finally, Wilkes included discussion of the parties’ ex
pectations81 but did not formally connect the expectations of share
holders to the two-part test it developed. We know that
shareholder expectations may matter, but not when they matter or
how.
II. DONAHUE REVISITED
One way to highlight unresolved issues in Wilkes is to apply
the two-part test to more difficult facts—those of Donahue, for in
stance. Setting aside the fact that Wilkes reaffirmed Donahue, and
thus appeared to endorse Donahue’s equal opportunity rule, at
least in the context of selective share repurchase arrangements, the
Wilkes test could be used to argue for a different outcome. Unlike
the equal opportunity rule, the Wilkes test does not dictate a result.
Under the first step of the Wilkes analysis, the controlling
shareholders in Donahue could have argued that there was a legiti
mate business purpose for the share repurchase plan—removing a
semi-retired member who had the ability to influence corporate
policies and to block efforts to build for the future.82 Acquiring his
78. Id. (“There was no showing of misconduct on Wilkes’s part as a director, of
ficer or employee of the corporation which would lead us to approve the majority ac
tion as a legitimate response to the disruptive nature of an undesirable individual bent
on injuring or destroying the corporation.”).
79. For conflicting court opinions, see infra Part III.A.
80. See infra Part III.B.
81. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63.
82. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 4, § 7:3, at 7-16 (“A buyout agreement tied
to a shareholder’s retirement or withdrawal from the business can work to insure that
the corporation will continue to be owned by those who are actively involved in the
business and thereby reduce potential conflict between active and passive
shareholders.”).
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shares would set the foundation for stable management of the cor
poration. The problems for corporate governance posed by retired
shareholders are well understood, and it is not uncommon for close
corporations to have mandatory repurchase agreements in place.83
Some commentators have argued that the majority’s stated purpose
was legitimate and justified its actions.84
On the other hand, the plaintiff, Ms. Donahue, might have re
sponded that arranging special liquidity for an exiting shareholder
who was the father of the next generation of managers was more
about family loyalty than business justification. Also, if the control
ling shareholders owed her a duty of the utmost loyalty, and if the
definition of fiduciary duty adopted in Donahue and affirmed in
Wilkes explicitly rejects the sort of arm’s length “conduct permissi
ble in a workaday world,”85 she might have argued that something
more than a mere commercial purpose would be necessary to justify
the repurchase of only a majority shareholder’s stock. Arguments
along these lines expose a conflict between the values of efficient
governance and shareholder loyalty. Wilkes recognizes the impor
tance of both values, but does not explain how they are to be recon
ciled in determining whether the majority has established a
legitimate business purpose for its actions.
Nor is it clear how the second step of the Wilkes analysis would
apply to Donahue. On what basis do we decide whether a less
harmful alternative is reasonably available? One can imagine many
approaches to this problem.86 Perhaps the issue is whether buying
out all shareholders who wished to tender their shares would cause
the corporation to go bankrupt or to lose out on important business
83. 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 6:11, at 6-35 (rev. 2d ed. 2005) (“Restrictions
are commonly placed on the transferability of stock in close corporations . . . and are
often accompanied by buyback agreements permitting or requiring the purchaser of a
shareholder’s stock triggered by . . . retirement. . . .”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 294 (1986)
(“Buy-out arrangements on contingencies such as retirement are common in closely
held corporations.”).
84. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 83, at 295 (“The purchase appears to
have been nothing more than an attempt to facilitate the retirement of a manager who,
by virtue of advancing age and poor health, could no longer contribute.”).
85. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 516 (Mass. 1975) (quoting
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
86. See, e.g., Moll, The Unanswered Question of Perspective, supra note 8, at 773
(noting that the import of the Wilkes test “depends upon what the courts will consider a
less harmful alternative” and that a cost-insensitive approach would be very different
than one that required the alternative to be “equally feasible and cost-effective to the
corporation”).
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opportunities; or maybe a less serious but still significant economic
difficulty would suffice.87 Even if the standard were clear, a court
would have to inform itself about the corporation’s financial posi
tion and its future prospects in order to evaluate the appropriate
ness of a complex business judgment.
In sum, although Wilkes explicitly affirms Donahue, its own
analytic framework would seem to permit a finding for either the
plaintiff or the defendants.88 Certainly, the defendants could have
made facially plausible arguments that the share repurchase was
supported by a valid business purpose and that the alternative of
repurchasing everyone’s shares was not reasonably practicable.
Wilkes holds that legitimate business interests must be balanced
with reasonably available alternatives,89 but it does not say how
these concepts are to be identified or how the balancing should be
performed.
III. THE AFTERMATH

OF

WILKES

Despite its reworking of Donahue’s vague fiduciary command,
Wilkes has itself engendered uncertainty, and the Supreme Judicial
Court’s more recent decisions have not resolved fundamental ques
tions of interpretation. To be clear, this is not a criticism of the
outcome in any particular case. Nor do I mean to insist upon a
standard that can be applied mechanically. In a common law sys
tem it is not unusual for courts to consider all relevant facts and to
allow the legal principles to reveal themselves over time, as when a
sculptor carves away everything that does not belong in the finished
image.90 Rather, the question is whether Massachusetts’s approach
to shareholder oppression law satisfies the requirement that law
87. Notably, the majority shareholders did inform Ms. Donahue “that the corpo
ration would not purchase the shares and was not in a financial position to do so.”
Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511.
88. Indeed, we have not even touched upon the variety of arguments that might
be made about the shareholders’ expectations, since the Wilkes test does not formally
include expectations analysis.
89. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
90. See, e.g., Wayne R. Barnes, Contemplating a Civil Law Paradigm for a Future
International Commercial Code, 65 LA. L. REV. 677, 692 (2005) (“The common law
system has been described as the process of applying rules derived from case prece
dents, to new factual situations, all for the purpose of producing uniform, consistent,
and certain results.” (citing ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 245
(1966))).
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“be intelligible to law enforcers and law subjects and that justifica
tions be public.”91 Put more simply, what does Wilkes mean?
A satisfactory interpretation would need to resolve three diffi
culties: the absence of a clear standard for identifying a legitimate
business purpose; the absence of any standard for evaluating lessharmful alternatives; and, more recently, varying approaches to rea
sonable expectations analysis.
A. What is a Legitimate Business Purpose?
Under the Wilkes standard, majority shareholders might as
sume that they have the ability to fire a manager for poor perform
ance, even if the manager also owns shares in the corporation. The
right of selfish ownership, if it is to have substance, necessarily in
cludes latitude to take reasonable steps to protect the value of the
majority’s investment in the corporation. Yet, Wilkes’s acknowl
edgment that the majority “must have some room to maneuver”92
does not indicate whether a minority shareholder can be terminated
for poor performance, even in an at-will employment jurisdiction.
After all, as the court noted in Wilkes, permitting the majority to
terminate a shareholder employee may “effectively frustrate the
minority stockholder’s purposes in entering on the corporate ven
ture and also deny him an equal return on his investment.”93
Taking a narrow view, the Supreme Judicial Court held in
Pointer v. Castellani that it was a breach of fiduciary duty to remove
the president of a corporation, even though he had twice violated
the terms of a loan covenant with the corporation’s principal
lender, thereby exposing the corporation to the risk of bankruptcy,
and notwithstanding the fact that the other shareholders had lost
faith in his ability to manage the business on a profitable basis.94
On one occasion, the president had caused another business he co
owned to lend money to the corporation at very high interest
rates.95 Moreover, he had failed to disclose information about side
91. Kenneth W. Simons, Justification in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 698,
741 (1996) (reviewing ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)). To
avoid the problem of indeterminacy, it is not necessary to enable a court to “mechani
cally derive detailed norms from more general ones. Still, one would expect a justifying
theory of law to give considerable guidance.” Id. at 739.
92. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
93. Id. at 662-63.
94. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 813-14 (Mass. 2009). Although the case
involved an LLC, Massachusetts does not appear to distinguish between LLCs and
close corporations for purposes of shareholder oppression analysis. Id. at 815.
95. Id. at 813.
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real-estate ventures before recommending that the corporation sell
its property to his other venture at what turned out to be a low
value.96
To be sure, there was another side to the story in Pointer. The
plaintiff had plausible explanations for all the actions that led to his
removal. For instance, the parties had agreed that they had the
right to conduct competing business and, as the lower court found,
“no one . . . other than [plaintiff] had any interest in real estate
development.”97 But the question relevant to step one of the
Wilkes analysis is not whether the majority’s actions were indispu
tably correct, or whether some course of action less harmful to the
minority’s interests might have been pursued, but whether the ma
jority shareholders could articulate a legitimate business purpose
for the challenged conduct.98 The majority shareholders wanted to
put a manager in place that they trusted, yet the court found that
this violated their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder.99
By contrast, in Holland v. Burke, a Massachusetts Superior
Court Judge recently held that, notwithstanding a minority share
holder’s “expectation that he would continue to participate in cor
porate decisions,” there was “credible evidence [that] established a
breakdown over time of the relationship between [plaintiff] on the
one hand and the other three shareholders with respect to the dayto-day operations of the two inns and the long-term goal of the ven
ture.”100 Although there was no showing that plaintiff was unwill
ing to perform his job,101 or that he intended to damage the
business in any way, a personality conflict with the other sharehold
ers warranted his removal.102
96. Id. at 811-12.
97. Id. at 818.
98. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
99. Pointer, 918 N.E.2d at 816-17; see also Leslie v. Boston Software Collabora
tive, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 532605, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002)
(holding that although plaintiff “was hardly a model employee” his termination was not
justified because, “as a founder and a nearly one-third minority shareholder, he was
entitled to the utmost good faith and fair dealing”). The plaintiff in Leslie had been
known to carry a licensed firearm to the office and his termination followed an e-mail
message interpreted by the defendants as a threat of violence. Id. at *4 (referencing email message describing plaintiff’s wife’s statement that “‘[s]he reserves the right to
shoot Bob and (or) Mark at a moments [sic] notice or at a minimum to severely injure
them for what they are putting her through’” (second alteration in original)).
100. Holland v. Burke, No. BACV2005-00122A, 2008 WL 4959050 (Mass. Super.
Ct. June 18, 2008).
101. Id. The court observed that the plaintiff “was an articulate and principled
individual who had a different philosophy on how a business should be run.” Id.
102. Id.
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The Holland court distinguished Wilkes, stating that the major
ity’s primary goal did not appear to be “to prevent [plaintiff] from
continuing to receive money from the corporations.”103 However,
there were also striking similarities. First, the alleged freeze-out in
both cases occurred after the plaintiff had proposed that the other
shareholders buy out his interest in the business.104 Second, in Hol
land and Wilkes, the termination of the plaintiff’s employment
meant that he received no value going forward for his “25% inter
est.”105 Third, the dispute in both cases had to do as much with
clashing personalities as with any disagreement regarding business
objectives.106 The court in Wilkes emphasized that “[t]here was no
showing of misconduct on Wilkes’s part as a director, officer or em
ployee of the corporation which would lead us to approve the ma
jority action as a legitimate response to the disruptive nature of an
undesirable individual bent on injuring or destroying the corpora
tion.”107 Likewise, the record in Holland did not suggest any im
proper motive or conduct on the part of the plaintiff.108
In both Pointer and Holland, then, one could as easily use the
Wilkes analysis to support the opposite result. The legitimacy of a
business purpose depends upon the court’s judgment, and, as these
cases suggest, that judgment may vary substantially from case to
case. The central problem is not factual ambiguity, but rather the
103. Id.
104. Id. (“Holland proposed that he would surrender all of his shares for a total
price of $750,000.”); cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 660
61 (Mass. 1976) (“Wilkes . . . gave notice of his intention to sell his shares for an amount
based on an appraisal of their value.”).
105. Holland, 2008 WL 4959050 (“None of the entities has ever declared divi
dends.”); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664 (“Most important is the plain fact that the cutting
off of Wilkes’s salary, together with the fact that the corporation never declared a divi
dend . . . assured that Wilkes would receive no return at all from the corporation.”
(internal citation omitted)).
106. Holland, 2008 WL 4959050 (identifying as “a legitimate business purpose for
removing Holland as a director and officer . . . credible evidence [that] established a
breakdown over time of the relationship between Holland on the one hand and the
other three shareholders with respect to the day-to-day operations of the two inns and
the long-term goal of the venture”); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661 (“Despite a continuing
deterioration in his personal relationship with his associates, Wilkes had consistently
endeavored to carry on his responsibilities to the corporation in the same satisfactory
manner and with the same degree of competence he had previously shown.”).
107. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664.
108. Holland, 2008 WL 4959050. If anything, the dispute arose as a result of al
leged mismanagement on the part of the other shareholders. See id. (“He was at odds
with the other shareholders with respect to [their] company sponsored trips to Mexico,
inattention and accountability issues, and a general distaste for the others’ collective
approach to running a business.”).
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legal standard’s indeterminacy. According to Wilkes, legitimacy in
volves the perceived needs of the business, the selfish ownership
rights of the majority, and the duty of utmost loyalty, which is
sometimes described expansively as a principle of equal return on
investment. Not all of these interests can be vindicated at the same
time in every case.
B. What Alternatives Must the Majority Consider?
Even if courts could satisfactorily define the parameters of a
legitimate business purpose, Wilkes charges them with the addi
tional task of evaluating the suitability of alternative courses of ac
tion.109 The Wilkes court left open whether cost is no object, of
some import, or whether an alternative must be “equally feasible
and cost-effective to the corporation.”110 Further complicating
matters, Wilkes separated the threshold business purpose analysis
from the identification of alternatives, even though the two analyses
intertwine.111 It is hard to decide in a vacuum whether a business
decision was legitimate, and alternative choices may inform our un
derstanding of the majority’s actual decision. Obviously, if an
equally affordable and effective means of achieving the majority’s
stated purpose is eschewed in favor of a course of action that causes
harm to the minority, that foregone option is strong circumstantial
evidence that the majority intended to harm the minority or was
indifferent to the prospect.
However, there are countless alternatives that might be posited
in hindsight to any particular business decision. In many cases, a
suggested alternative will involve additional expense for the corpo
ration,112 and it will be unclear whether the alternative would have
successfully accomplished the business purpose. The business judg
ment rule, which insulates most corporate decisions from share
holder challenge, recognizes that this kind of second-guessing
invites litigation and reduces the value of the corporate enterprise
109. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. This difficulty will be felt, not only by courts, but
also by well-intentioned majority shareholders seeking to manage their businesses with
out oppressing minority shareholders in violation of Massachusetts law.
110. Moll, The Unanswered Question of Perspective, supra note 8, at 773.
111. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. Under the Wilkes test, defendants bear the bur
den of showing a legitimate business purpose; then, and only then, does plaintiff have
the burden of showing reasonably practicable alternatives. Id.
112. See Moll, The Unanswered Question of Perspective, supra note 8, at 774 (discussing hypothetical situation where minority shareholder challenges withholding of
dividends by pointing out that immediate business needs could have been satisfied by
borrowing money).
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for all investors; timid, risk-averse management is in no one’s best
interest.113 Although the business judgment rule has limited appli
cability to shareholder disputes in close corporations, given the
myriad ways that controlling shareholders can line their own pock
ets at the expense of minority shareholders,114 the alternative to
deference need not be the interposition of courts as after-the-fact
business managers.
A recent Massachusetts Superior Court case illustrates the
problem. In O’Connor v. United States Art Co., the minority share
holder was “charged with poor bookkeeping practices that left re
ceivables unaccounted for and payables outstanding” and he was
terminated.115 Even assuming that “these sloppy practices” had
been established, the court found that “[t]here clearly were less
harmful alternatives to firing” the plaintiff and described those al
ternatives as follows:
For example, [the corporation’s] controlling group could have . . .
hired a competent bookkeeper and made [the minority share
holder] vice president of marketing, with an adjustment in com
pensation to a modified salary-plus-commission based
compensation. Or the company treasurer, who from day one al
ways was [the majority shareholder], could have acted in a trea
surer’s function, not simply as a title holder. Or the stockholders
could have called a real meeting and discussed among the four of
them ways and means to correct the bookkeeping issues and still
preserve a role for [plaintiff] in the international sales aspects of
the business, in which no one said his skills were lacking. Indeed,
there are, this Court is confident, numerous other rational busi

113. See Stephen M. BAINBRIDGE, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 787 (2006) (contending that the business judgment
rule “is precisely the rule for which shareholders would bargain because they would
conclude that the systemic costs of judicial review exceed the benefits of punishing di
rector misfeasance and malfeasance”).
114. Controlling shareholders have a conflict of interest with respect to deci
sions—including salaries paid to themselves as employees of the corporation, or direc
tor’s fees they collect, or other transactions they may cause the corporation to engage
in—that benefit themselves individually. In the fiduciary language of corporate govern
ance, these kinds of decisions implicate the duty of loyalty. Stephen M. BAINBRIDGE,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
547, 580 N.162 (2003) (“Preventing directors from pursuing their self-interest, of course,
is the reason corporate law contains a duty of loyalty.”).
115. O’Connor v. U.S. Art Co., No. 031728BLS, 2005 WL 1812512, at *9 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 27, 2005), aff’d 66 Mass. App. Ct. 1118 (2006).
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ness means for solving the bookkeeping issues short of firing [the
minority shareholder] and shutting down the business.116

When courts speculate about alternative choices, and how
those choices would have worked out, while conceding that the ma
jority’s actual choice advanced a legitimate business purpose, we
have more than a departure from the business judgment rule—
there is a total obliteration of the concept.117 It is one thing to rec
ognize a duty of loyalty issue and to require the majority to defend
the entire fairness of a particular decision; it is another to decide
liability based upon a universe of other possibilities that, viewed
after the fact, might also have advanced the majority’s purpose.118
C. What is the Role of Reasonable Expectations?
Further complicating the application of the Wilkes standard is
the court’s observation that firing a shareholder employee or “sev
ering him from a position as an officer or director” might “frustrate
the minority stockholder’s purposes in entering . . . the corporate
venture.”119 Although Wilkes indicates that shareholder expecta
tions are relevant, the court does not make reasonable expectations
a formal part of its two-part shareholder oppression analysis.120
The Supreme Judicial Court has suggested recently that reasonable
expectations analysis is, in fact, a separate inquiry: “A breach of
116. Id. My critique here concerns the undefined nature of the Wilkes analysis,
not the court’s judgment in this case concerning a situation where the parties’ negotia
tions through counsel toward an amicable separation ended abruptly when the majority
shareholder decided instead to use its control to terminate the minority’s involvement
in the business. See id. For a more questionable result, see Leslie v. Boston Software
Collaborative, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 532605, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12,
2002), in which the court found that less harmful alternatives for dealing with a share
holder who had alienated coworkers and clients, and who arguably had threatened vio
lence, included modifying his job description “such that he could have been insulated
from direct contact with . . . employees” and helping plaintiff “becom[e] more exten
sively involved in off-site, time-and-materials billing projects.”
117. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 242 (“[T]he business judgment rule says
that courts must defer to the board of director’s judgment absent highly unusual
exceptions.”).
118. In this issue, Professor Kleinberger defends the value of Wilkes’s second
step, because it gives courts the ability to analyze claims of oppression in situations
where neither party is without fault. See Daniel Kleinberger, Donahue’s Fils Aı̂né: Re
flections on Wilkes and the Legitimate Rights of Selfish Ownership, 33 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 405 (2011) (“Wilkes is most important when both sides can justifiably point fingers
at each other.”) However, this judicial flexibility comes at the cost of considerable un
certainty in the legal standard.
119. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662-63 (Mass.
1976).
120. Id. at 663-64.
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fiduciary duty through a freeze-out also occurs when the reasonable
expectations of a shareholder are frustrated.”121
If reasonable expectations analysis matters but is not actually
part of the Wilkes test, then what happens if the reasonable expec
tations analysis and the Wilkes analysis point in different direc
tions? In general, Massachusetts courts seem to require that a
plaintiff establish oppression under both theories.122 Accordingly,
after a minority shareholder uses the reasonable expectations the
ory to allege “a breach of fiduciary duty, the court must allow the
controlling group to demonstrate a ‘legitimate business purpose for
its action.’”123 However, if the plaintiff cannot establish a reasona
ble expectation, then the court will find for the defendant. As a
practical matter, reasonable expectations may have become a dispositive, threshold analysis. Thus, it is important to know what
counts as a reasonable expectation.
In some cases, the Massachusetts courts have relied upon a
careful assessment of the parties’ actual, bargained-for expecta
tions.124 For example, in Merola v. Exergen Corp.,125 the Supreme
Judicial Court used reasonable expectations analysis to preclude li
ability even though the plaintiff might have had a colorable argu
ment for breach of duty under the Wilkes standard.126 The court
held that the majority shareholder had not violated a fiduciary duty
by firing the minority shareholder.127 Rather than apply the Wilkes
121. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816 (Mass. 2009) (emphasis added).
122. See, e.g., Murphy v. Grey, No. 051951B, 2007 WL 3014730, at *6 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2007) (“There can be little doubt that being terminated from the
corporation of which he was a co-owner and co-founder would frustrate Murphy’s ex
pectations of the benefits of ownership. However, to establish that the defendants are
liable Murphy must show that the defendants acted improperly in some way—i.e., they
did not have any legitimate business purpose—when they terminated him.”). One
court reviewed plaintiff’s claim under both theories, without deciding which analysis
controls, simply because it could not be sure what Massachusetts law requires. See
Keating v. Keating, Nos. 00749, 00748 2003 WL 23213143, at *15 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
3, 2003) (“In the wake of the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Merola, the proper
analytical framework for this Court to employ in passing on the merits of [the] freezeout claim is not entirely clear.”).
123. Pointer, 918 N.E.2d at 816.
124. See, e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Mass. 1996); Hol
land v. Burke, No. BACV200500122A, 2008 WL 4514664, at *7 (Mass. Super Ct. June
18, 2008) (holding that plaintiff had not “established that he had a reasonable expecta
tion of continued employment . . ., that a guaranty of employment was a major reason
for his investment of capital, or that he was relying on employment by the LLC and two
corporations for his livelihood”).
125. Merola, 668 N.E.2d at 354.
126. Id. at 354.
127. Id. at 354-55.
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test, the court focused instead upon the minority shareholder’s lack
of a reasonable expectation of employment.128 The court acknowl
edged that the principle of employment at will may conflict with a
majority shareholder’s “fiduciary duty to the minority interest.”129
To the extent the majority is obligated to demonstrate a legitimate
business purpose for conduct that disadvantages a minority share
holder, it would seem to follow that the employment-at-will doc
trine is limited when an employee is a minority shareholder.
Yet, the court declined to apply Wilkes in this fashion and in
stead distinguished Wilkes on its facts.130 Whereas the plaintiff
shareholder in Wilkes depended “‘on his salary as the principal re
turn on his investment,’”131 the court found that “there was no evi
dence that the corporation distributed all profits to shareholders in
the form of salaries.”132 More significant, the court concluded that
the plaintiff’s stock ownership was separate from his employment
status:
Here, although the plaintiff invested in the stock of Exergen
with the reasonable expectation of continued employment, there
was no general policy regarding stock ownership and employ
ment, and there was no evidence that any other stockholders had
expectations of continuing employment because they purchased
stock. The investment in the stock was an investment in the eq
uity of the corporation which was not tied to employment in any
formal way. The plaintiff . . . testified that he was induced to
work for Exergen with the promise that he could become a major
stockholder. There was no testimony that he was ever required
to buy stock as a condition of employment.133

The court relied upon Wilkes’s statement that the majority
“‘must have some room to maneuver in establishing the business
policy of the corporation,’”134 and upheld the employment action
even though “there was no legitimate business purpose for the ter
mination of the plaintiff.”135 The court gave significant weight to
128. Id. The lower court had adopted the jury’s finding that “there was no legiti
mate business purpose for not continuing the plaintiff’s employment.” Id. at 353.
129. Id. at 354.
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662
(Mass. 1976)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 355 (quoting Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663).
135. Id. In other words, the defendant could not satisfy step one of the Wilkes
test.
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the fact that “[t]he plaintiff was terminated in accordance with his
employment contract and fairly compensated for his stock.”136
In other cases, the Supreme Judicial Court has taken a more
expansive view of reasonable expectations, highlighting the minor
ity’s general expectation of benefit from share ownership rather
than a specific, bargained-for expectation. For example, in Brodie
v. Jordan,137 the plaintiff complained that the majority shareholders
excluded her from participation and hindered her ability to sell her
shares, in part by refusing to perform a valuation of the corporation
that might have facilitated a sale of her stock to an outside party.138
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower
court’s judgment of liability and concluded that the court “properly
analyzed the defendants’ liability in terms of the plaintiff’s reasona
ble expectations of benefit.”139 The court did not consider whether
the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that the corporation
136. Id. If Merola has a flaw, it is that the court appears to give total priority to
the absence of shareholder expectations, even where the defendants lack a business
justification for their actions. As an initial matter, the Merola court’s refusal to give any
weight to the lack of business justification could confuse lower courts into believing that
the Supreme Judicial Court intended to remove whatever constraints Wilkes imposes
on judicial discretion. See Keating v. Keating, Nos. 00749, 00748, 2003 WL 23213143, at
*15 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2003) (“In Merola v. Exergen, Corp., the Supreme Judicial
Court seemed to eschew the Wilkes ‘legitimate business purpose’ test in favor of an
inquiry based more on fairness and equity.”). Also, regardless of the parties’ actual
expectations, the lack of a legitimate business purpose can evidence oppressive conduct.
See supra Part I.B. This is particularly true since trust is what makes closely held busi
nesses possible, and, with no ability to specify all important contractual terms in ad
vance, the minority is exposed to the majority’s opportunistic self-dealing. In other
words, the fact that the minority shareholders never thought about a particular issue
does not mean that they consented to the majority’s exploitation of its power to their
disadvantage.
137. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006).
138. See id. at 1078-79 (“[T]he plaintiff asked [defendants] to perform a valuation
of the company so that she could ascertain the value of her shares, but such a valuation
was never performed.”).
139. Id. at 1080. In remanding the case, the court stated that the award of a
buyout was not appropriate because “it placed the plaintiff in a significantly better posi
tion than she would have enjoyed absent the wrongdoing, and well exceeded her rea
sonable expectations of benefit from her shares.” Id. at 1081. Although the Brodie
court held that reasonable expectations “analysis is useful at both the liability and rem
edy stages of freeze-out litigation,” id. at 1080, it appeared to assess those two kinds of
expectations differently. For purposes of liability, what mattered was the plaintiff’s gen
eral expectation that she would benefit from owning stock. Id. In awarding a remedy,
though, the court observed that there was “nothing in the background law, the gov
erning rules of this particular close corporation, or any other circumstance that could
have given the plaintiff a reasonable expectation of having her shares bought out.” Id.
at 1081. Thus, the court studied the parties’ actual bargain to limit the remedy but not
to decide liability. Id.
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would, at its own expense, perform a valuation simply to allow her
to sell her shares. Indeed, absent some explicitly bargained for pro
vision, it is hard to see why a shareholder would expect the corpora
tion to undertake such an expense.140
In sum, a defendant’s ability to avoid liability under reasonable
expectations analysis may depend upon whether the court chooses
to enforce the minority’s general expectation that it will benefit
from its stock ownership, regardless of the specific circumstances,
or whether the court instead seeks to ascertain whether the parties’
actual bargain governs the matter at issue. In particular, a focus on
the parties’ specific bargain will constrain the minority’s ability to
recover if the minority had no specific expectation one way or the
other with respect to the matter at issue.141
As discussed in the next Part, reasonable expectations analysis
has great promise for improving the fiduciary approach to claims of
shareholder oppression. By assessing the parties’ understood bar
gain, courts can prevent majority shareholders from opportunisti
cally abusing their control to deprive minority shareholders of the
reasonable expectations that motivated their investment. Also,
consideration of the parties’ bargain—interpreted broadly to en
compass the overall structure of their relationship—would limit the
minority’s ability to use litigation to rewrite the terms of the deal in
its own favor. Greater reliance on shareholder expectations analy
sis would advance Wilkes’s goal of providing a measured structure
for fiduciary analysis, balancing the majority’s right to pursue legiti
mate business purposes with a strong duty of loyalty owed to vul
nerable minority shareholders.142
IV.

PROTECTING

THE

PARTIES’ BARGAIN

Despite Wilkes’s flaws, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court is not likely to abandon the signature fiduciary approach to
140. Put in terms of the Wilkes test, there would appear to be a legitimate busi
ness purpose for declining to perform a valuation exercise solely for the benefit of a
minority stockholder.
141. Conversely, if the parties have an actual bargain with respect to a particular
issue, such as minority employment, the majority cannot contravene that understanding
simply by citing a legitimate business purpose. For instance, even if it would be cheaper
for the business to replace the minority shareholder with an employee willing to work
for lower wages, those cost savings would not ordinarily justify the termination of the
minority shareholder’s employment.
142. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976)
(stating that “courts must weigh the legitimate business purpose, if any, against the
practicability of a less harmful alternative”).
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shareholder oppression it has developed over the last thirty-five
years; fortunately, no radical change is needed. Wilkes contains the
DNA for a more bargain-focused approach to oppression because it
highlights the problem that majority exclusion of the minority may
“effectively frustrate the minority stockholder’s purposes in enter
ing on the corporate venture.”143 In more recent cases, like Merola,
the court has used reasonable expectations analysis to identify and
enforce the parties’ actual bargain.144
By situating shareholder oppression analysis within the context
of the parties’ contractual relationship, the reasonable expectations
inquiry would help Massachusetts courts apply a more tempered
version of fiduciary duty—consistent with Wilkes’s purpose—with
out resting liability judgments entirely on a see-saw between two
under-defined concepts: legitimate business purpose and reasona
ble alternatives. Minority shareholder protection can be under
stood as an extension of contract theory, providing a constraint
against opportunistic action by the majority that violates the par
ties’ reasonable expectations in entering into a long-term
relationship.145
Under Wilkes, the key question is whether the majority has a
legitimate business purpose, but it should also matter whether the
majority has acted in accord with the parties’ basic agreement—
both to prevent the minority from claiming an entitlement to bene
fits it bargained away and to prevent the majority from violating
mutually understood expectations in the name of business expedi
ence. Thus, contract theory helps explain what makes an expecta
tion “reasonable,” and reasonable expectations analysis can
establish a boundary for fiduciary duty.146
143. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
144. Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354-55 (Mass. 1996).
145. Close corporations are quintessential relational contracts. The founding
shareholders negotiate a long-term, open-ended relationship with each other for the
general purpose of operating a profitable business. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder
Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: Of Change, Gifts, and Inheritances in Close
Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717, 756 (2002) (“[T]he investment bargains
entered into by close corporation shareholders reflect the characteristics of relational
contracts.”).
146. On some accounts, this version of reasonable expectations analysis may dif
fer from a true fiduciary approach. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE
UNCORPORATION 166 (2010) (“[C]ontrolling shareholders should not have fiduciary du
ties to noncontrolling shareholders. . . . [T]he law need only constrain opportunism by
holding the controller to its express or implied contractual obligations, including the
duty of good faith . . . .”). However, at least in Massachusetts, bargain analysis has
become increasingly central to defining the shareholders’ fiduciary duty: Wilkes identi
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A. The Contractual Approach
Through the rubric of objectively reasonable expectations,
courts can account for the interests of all shareholders. Accord
ingly, the parties’ fiduciary duties to one another should be under
stood in context; they have chosen to enter a business venture and
have voluntarily undertaken certain obligations. By its nature, a
long-term agreement to own and operate a corporate venture can
not be fully specified in advance.147 When the intention is to estab
lish a relationship more than a discrete bargain, this open texture is,
in fact, part of the agreement.148 Through the mechanism of major
ity control, provided as part of the default rules of corporate law,
the corporation retains the ability to adapt.149 However, should the
majority take opportunistic advantage of its control to exclude the
minority from the value of the corporation—conduct that the mi
nority would never have agreed to at a hypothetical bargaining ta
ble and that lies far outside the parties’ objectively reasonable
expectations at the time of investment—the majority would act in
contravention of the equitable duty of good faith and fair dealing
implied as a term in every contract.150
Shareholder oppression law, therefore, involves the enforce
ment of the parties’ reasonable expectations. Actions that violate
the reasonable expectations of the parties will also breach the im
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every con
tract.151 The enforcement of expectations is not limited to a narrow
interpretation of the parties’ literal contract. Rather, courts should
identify and enforce the parties’ central understanding, their bar
gain, even assuming the bargain is unwritten and would not be defi
fied the importance of shareholder expectations and subsequent Massachusetts cases
have focused upon the parties’ actual bargain in assessing those expectations. See supra
Parts I.B, III.A-C.
147. See Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract:
A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 216 (1992) (“Viewed contractu
ally, the typical closely held corporation is mostly gaps.”).
148. When all important issues cannot be resolved ahead of time, rational parties
may substitute equitable obligations for detailed contract terms. See Easterbrook &
Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 34, at 427.
149. See O’Kelley, supra note 147, at 225 (“[W]hile contractual specification of
rights and duties may provide protection against opportunistic withdrawal, the parties
may also incur significant costs from lost flexibility.”).
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); O’Kelley, supra
note 147, at 222 (“Opportunistic actors seek to extract an advantage which would be
denied them if the party with whom they deal had full information.”).
151. See Means, A Contractual Approach, supra note 11, at 41.

R
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nite enough to enforce under conventional contract doctrine.152
Fiduciary duty may prohibit other forms of overreaching—the pros
pects for self-dealing are limited only by the imagination of control
ling shareholders—but “good faith” and other well-accepted
equitable contract principles offer useful guidelines for the protec
tion of minority shareholders in close corporations.
B. Reasonable Expectations in Massachusetts
Recent Massachusetts case law shows the utility of a contrac
tual approach to shareholder oppression.153 Compare, for example,
the court’s use of reasonable expectations analysis in O’Brien v.
Pearson with the court’s application of the standard Wilkes test.154
In O’Brien, the court found that the majority had breached its fidu
ciary duty to the minority shareholder by failing to follow through
on its promise to fund a development project.155 The minority
shareholder, O’Brien, was a builder and had solicited the majority
shareholders’ participation in a venture that involved acquiring dis
tressed properties from a bankrupt developer and completing the
construction of the buildings in order to eventually bring them to
the market for sale.156 Although this was the parties’ original un
derstanding, the majority shareholders decided to turn a quick and
handsome profit by allowing a third party to satisfy the outstanding
mortgages and to take on the risk of development.157
On a broad expectation of benefit, everyone had done well, but
the controlling shareholders had not held to the original business
plan.158 Therefore, the most direct way of assessing liability was to
determine whether the parties had an enforceable bargain and, if
so, whether the majority shareholders violated the bargain, depriv
ing the minority shareholder of his objectively reasonable expecta
tions.159 Had the investors made their low risk tolerance known,
152. Douglas Moll points out that “[a]lthough both oppression precedents and
contract precedents base their decisions on breached ‘agreements’ and ‘understandings’
between the parties, it is clear that different meanings are ascribed to these terms.”
Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts, supra note 11, at 1066.
Moll concludes that “it is fair to assert that oppression law is doing what contract law
should be doing if contract law took a broader perspective when identifying and enforc
ing bargains.” Id. at 1073.
153. See, e.g., Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351 (Mass. 1996).
154. See O’Brien v. Pearson, 868 N.E.2d 118, 125-26 (Mass. 2007).
155. Id. at 126.
156. Id. at 121.
157. Id. at 123-24.
158. Id. at 126.
159. Id.

R
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O’Brien might have found other backers; a quick profit for the in
vestors may have meant the loss, from O’Brien’s perspective, of a
once-in-a-lifetime business opportunity.160 Despite the lack of mea
surable damages,161 the majority’s ignored promise to fund the de
velopment project arguably breached an agreement among the
shareholders that the majority shareholders would provide funding
until completion of the project.
The court provides just this kind of contractual analysis in re
jecting the “argument that O’Brien could not compel [the defend
ants] to invest their own money.”162 As the court observes, the
defendants’ objection “misses the point.”163 The parties had a
bargain:
The defendants’ breach did not arise from their failure to
purchase the entire subdivision, but rather it occurred when they
unilaterally decided, after promising to fund the project to the
extent that it was economically feasible, to turn away from pur
suit of the agreed-on objective in favor of their preferred
alternative.164

By analyzing the parties’ reasonable expectations in terms of
their actual bargain, the court can explain why O’Brien has a claim
“despite over-all profits to the corporation and, derivatively,
O’Brien.”165
160. Id.
161. Id. at 129. The minority shareholder suffered no damages because the even
tual outcome of the development project was uncertain, while the majority’s alternative
course—obtaining an essentially risk free, four-fold return on its investment—was
shared with him. Id. at 128-29.
162. Id. at 126.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The calculation of damages is, of course, another matter. Having af
firmed the liability judgment, however, the court rejected the award of $900,000 in dam
ages. Id. at 129. Instead, the court relied upon Brodie’s holding “that the appropriate
remedy ‘should, to the extent possible, restore to the minority shareholder those bene
fits which [he] reasonably expected, but has not received because of the fiduciary
breach.’” Id. at 128 (citing Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (Mass. 2006)). The
court held that plaintiff had not established damages, because the profits that might
have been achieved had the project been seen through to completion were too specula
tive. Id. at 128-29. O’Brien hoped that the project would succeed, but he could not
reasonably expect as much. Id. at 129. Although the court remanded for further pro
ceedings on the issue of damages, it sent a strong signal that plaintiff’s recovery would
be the “forty-eight per cent of the mortgage discharge proceeds” he would receive in
the ordinary course, since he would have to forego that recovery in order to pursue a
different damages theory. See id. at 130 n.13.
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The court’s holding that defendants were also liable under the
two-part Wilkes test is much less convincing. Indeed, the Wilkes
test makes it very difficult to capture the key point that the defend
ants promised to do one thing in order to join the venture and in
stead did something else entirely. Applying the Wilkes test, the
court acknowledged that obtaining a relatively high, risk free return
on an investment rather than gambling on a real estate venture’s
long-term success was a legitimate business purpose.166
Because the defendants easily satisfied the first step of the
Wilkes analysis, the court, if it meant to hold the defendants liable,
had to find that there was “a reasonably practicable alternative
course” that would have been less harmful to the minority’s inter
ests.167 Yet, O’Brien suffered no financial injury—he shared in the
profit from sale of the property and the possibility of greater profits
was speculative.168 The court reasoned that the “alternative course
would have included a more open, communicative, and inclusive
manner of engagement between the defendants and O’Brien”169
but failed to offer any support for a finding that funding the devel
opment project would have improved O’Brien’s financial
position.170
Thus, reasonable expectations analysis seems closer to our in
tuitions about why majority conduct may oppress the minority. As
O’Brien also illustrates, there remains the issue of reconciling the
reasonable expectations approach to shareholder oppression with
the two-part Wilkes test. According to Professors Moll and
Ragazzo, Merola stands for the proposition, applicable across juris
dictions, that there is a threshold test that a plaintiff’s claim must
satisfy:
When the minority asserts that he has been deprived of employ
ment or some other non-traditional shareholder benefit, how
ever, his burden of proving that his shareholder rights have been
harmed is satisfied only by showing that, in the corporation at
issue, the benefit was part of his rights as a shareholder.171
166. Id. at 126.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 128-29.
169. Id. at 126.
170. The only harm to weigh against the majority’s legitimate business purpose
was O’Brien’s exclusion from participation, but it is awkward to characterize the pro
cess of making a decision as an alternative to the decision itself.
171. MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 41, at 7-64.

R
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On this view, if a minority shareholder could not expect a ben
efit simply by virtue of share ownership, the minority must show
that a bargain existed among the shareholders concerning that
benefit.172
Reasonable expectations analysis can also be extended beyond
non-traditional benefits, since even core benefits, such as dividends,
are subject to the discretion of the board of directors (and thus con
trolled by the majority shareholders). A minority shareholder has
no automatic right to dividends but should be permitted to argue on
the facts, including course-of-performance evidence, that the share
holders had an agreement to distribute corporate revenue as divi
dends. Perhaps, therefore, reasonable expectations should always
be the threshold inquiry in a shareholder oppression case. In
Wilkes, the plaintiff’s expectation as a founding investor and full
participant in a business idea he had generated was continued em
ployment and an equal return.173 In fact, the threshold, contractual
inquiry seems conclusive.174
V. WILKES REVISITED
If shareholder oppression law, properly understood, involves
nothing more than identifying and enforcing the parties’ actual bar
gain, then reasonable expectations analysis is more than a threshold
inquiry—it comprehensively resolves any conceivable claim of op
pression. For that to be true, though, it must be the case that all the
values at stake in a claim of shareholder oppression are, at bottom,
contractual values.175 If so, then the Wilkes test is not just vacuous
as a descriptive matter but also normatively undesirable and, in
deed, irrelevant.
This single-value approach may explain why the Delaware Su
preme Court dismissed the need for a doctrine of shareholder op
172. In Massachusetts, notwithstanding Moll and Ragazzo’s cogent analysis, it re
mains unclear whether expectations analysis constitutes a threshold inquiry, and, if so,
whether it is dispositive or merely instructive.
173. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 660-61 (Mass.
1976).
174. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 13, at 820 (“[T]his case could have been decided as a simple breach of contract.”).
175. This claim is consistent with the view that the corporation is a nexus of con
tracts. See Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to
Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1266, 1266 (1999) (“[A]ccording to the law and economics perspective that the
nexus-of-contracts approach to corporate law exemplifies, one should view the corpora
tion as a ‘complex set of explicit and implicit contracts.’” (citation omitted)).
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pression on the ground that “[t]he tools of good corporate practice
. . . give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to bar
gain for protection before parting with consideration.”176 Accord
ing to law and economics, market logic explains a wide variety of
social choices, including those that have an explicitly ethical dimen
sion; for example, how much environmental protection do we wish
to purchase? Is the cost of preventing the accident cheaper than
the harm prevented, accounting also for the likelihood of the
harm?177 And so on. The economic perspective is “monistic” be
cause it posits one value—economic efficiency—as the measuring
stick for social choice.178 On this view, the only question we need
to ask to resolve a shareholder oppression claim is whether the ma
jority’s action violated either the background rules of corporate law
or a bargained-for provision in the articles of incorporation, by
laws, or shareholder agreement.179
For value pluralists, however, no single value exists against
which all other ethical choices can be measured.180 Rather, we are
often forced to choose among values, not because we are maximiz
ing some greater value (like economic efficiency), but because our
most fundamental priorities are not consistent and cannot all be re
alized.181 The values are incommensurable. Even if we could as
sign a price to environmental protection, for instance by studying
the “revealed preferences” of consumers’ willingness to pay more
for environmentally friendly products, “the assumption of commen
surability does a kind of conceptual violence to the underlying val

176. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993); see also Dalley, supra
note 35, at 222 (“Controlling stockholders’ fiduciary duties are a judicial invention stimulated by a desire to provide relief to minority stockholders who later regretted their
own or their decedent’s bargains . . .”).
177. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–71 (7th ed. 2007).
178. Id. at 19 (“Economists can usually appeal to a generally accepted goal, such
as maximizing the value of output, rather than having to defend the goal.”). According
to standard economic reasoning, economic efficiency follows when individuals engage
in non-coerced market transactions to satisfy their own preferences. See, e.g., RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM 42 (2003).
179. See, e.g., Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380 (“One could bargain for definitive provi
sions of self-ordering permitted to a Delaware corporation through the certificate of
incorporation or by-laws” or “enter into definitive stockholder agreements, and such
agreements may provide for elaborate earnings tests, buy-out provisions, voting trusts,
or other voting agreements.”).
180. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 213 (Henry Hardy
ed., 2002).
181. Id.
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ues, converting genuine qualitative differences into merely
quantitative ones.”182
The initial payoff for applying value pluralism theory to share
holder oppression law is that it explains why Massachusetts courts
might hold, despite the apparent contradiction, that majority share
holders have a right of selfish ownership and a duty of utmost loy
alty. In Massachusetts (and elsewhere), courts appear to recognize
conflicting values and, depending on the facts of particular cases,
give fuller effect to certain values at the expense of other values at
stake in a particular dispute.183 To the extent shareholder oppres
sion law is value pluralistic, it may be unfair to criticize Wilkes for
giving weight to competing, sometimes irreconcilable values.184
The shareholder oppression’s context-specific nature eludes easy
categorization.
Value pluralism may also explain some subtler aspects of
Wilkes’s efforts to accommodate inconsistent principles. On a
value-pluralist view, for instance, the Wilkes court’s insistence that
the majority at least “consider” that its action would “disregard . . .
long-standing policy” is interesting because it places emphasis on
the process of choosing rather than the choice itself.185 Where plu
ral values are at stake and there is no axiomatically correct way to
proceed, one response is to focus instead on improving decisionmaking by ensuring that all relevant perspectives and values are
182. Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and Conceptually Sequenced Ar
gument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487, 1488 (1998).
183. Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 266 (S.C. 2001)
(“We find . . . that the terms ‘oppressive’ and ‘unfairly prejudicial’ are elastic terms
whose meaning varies with the circumstances presented in a particular case.”). The
point can be overstated, though. For example, enforcing the equitable duty of good
faith and fair dealing can sometimes advance the parties’ autonomy interests in that it
requires them to live up to the bargain they actually understood, even if opportunistic
exploitation of contractual incompleteness later tempts the stronger party. See Means,
A Contractual Approach, supra note 11. Even so, we cannot assume that vindicating
autonomy interests in a particular case will always advance equitable good faith con
cerns and vice versa.
184. The problem of competing values has been recognized in other areas of law.
For instance, a number of scholars have argued against unitary theories of tort law. See,
e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Analysis: Evidence from
Cardozo and Posner Torts Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REV. 667, 676-77 (2010) (describing
tension between “social wealth or utility maximization” and “corrective justice”); Chris
topher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 329, 330. 360 (2007) (advocating a value pluralistic approach to tort law); Gary T.
Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Jus
tice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802, 1818 (1997) (advocating, on practical grounds, that tort
law accommodate conflicting values).
185. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Mass. 1976).
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aired in a fully deliberative process.186 In Wilkes, consistent with
value pluralism, the focus on considered choice suggests that legiti
macy cannot be assessed solely based on economic impact.
Subsequent Massachusetts courts have highlighted the pres
ence or absence of a reasoned decision-making process. In
O’Brien, for instance, the court noted that “pursuing a risk-averse
effort to recoup the initial investment with some return” was a
“narrower” objective than that originally contemplated by the par
ties but still within the range of “legitimate.”187 However, in light
of the minority’s strong objection, “[a] reasonably practicable alter
native course would have included a more open, communicative,
and inclusive manner of engagement between the defendants and
O’Brien. Without such a dialogue, the corporate sea change that
occurred . . . could be interpreted by the jury as a breach of fiduci
ary duty.”188 In Pointer, the court approved the lower court’s find
ing that the other shareholders “owed [plaintiff], who was a fortythree per cent owner . . . , real substance and communication, in
cluding efforts to resolve supposed complaints by less drastic mea
sures than termination. But such efforts never truly were
attempted.”189 Thus, the same decision might be acceptable if
made after a properly noticed meeting and on the basis of full infor
mation, including minority shareholder participation.
Alternatively, courts might treat evidence that the minority
was walled off from a decision as reason to worry about disingenu
ous business purposes advanced by the majority after the fact.190
This seems more plausible than offering process as a direct alterna
tive to a given business decision. I have previously argued that mi
nority shareholder “voice” should matter in oppression cases, not as
a substantive right—unless bargained for as such—but as possible
evidence of the good faith of the controlling shareholders, and that
186. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
241 (1993) (stating that the “American constitutional system” is designed “to ensure
discussion and debate among people who are genuinely different in their perspectives
and position, in the interest of creating a process through which reflection will en
courage the emergence of general truths”).
187. O’Brien v. Pearson, 868 N.E.2d 118, 126 (Mass. 2007).
188. Id.
189. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 818 (Mass. 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also O’Connor v. U.S. Art Co., No. 031728BLS, 2005 WL 1812512
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 2005).
190. Of course, a savvy majority could use the appearance of process to provide
cover for decisions it already intended to make, but that objection can be made with
respect to any decision that relies upon deliberation among interested parties and that
requires a modicum of good faith.
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courts should more closely scrutinize cases where the minority
shareholder has been cut out of the decision-making process.191 As
in O’Brien, the exclusion of a participant may indicate that the con
trolling shareholders have decided to turn the venture to their own
advantage, regardless of the expectations of the minority.192
Also, if the values at stake in shareholder oppression litigation
can be arranged logically according to relative priority, we can
structure the court’s decision sequence to reflect those priorities
without excluding values or making a single value decisive. Profes
sor Bruce Chapman has described this as a “conceptually se
quenced” argument.193 The Wilkes test establishes priorities—first,
the majority must show a legitimate business purpose, second, the
minority must establish reasonable alternatives—but does not give
the first value absolute priority over the second.194 If the majority
cannot show a legitimate purpose, the court need not consider
whether another, less-harmful approach was possible. However, if
the parties can establish, respectively, a business purpose and some
plausible alternatives, the court will assess the strength of the alter
natives in light of the proffered purpose.195
Understood as a conceptually sequenced analysis, Wilkes
makes sense. If the controlling shareholders do not have a good
business reason for what they have done, it seems odd to ask
whether there was a less drastic way of doing it. Logic defers con
sideration of the alternatives until the appropriateness of the origi
nal choice has been established.196 Thus, Wilkes’s conceptual
sequencing can be defended as a rational response to incommensu
rability. To complete the Wilkes test, reasonable expectations
should be considered a threshold, non-dispositive but shaping in
quiry—giving us a three-part test. Reasonable expectations, in
191. See Means, A Voice-Based Framework, supra note 7, at 1218-19.
192. At the same time, majority shareholders have the right and the ability to
decide contested questions as they see fit, so long as they do not oppress the minority.
193. Chapman, supra note 182, at 1515.
194. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976).
195. Id.
196. For much the same reason, the criminal law concept of “excuse” cannot be
evaluated until it has been determined whether a crime was committed. See Chapman,
supra note 182, at 1515 (“For the notion of an excuse is an essentially (conceptually)
sequenced idea; without a prior act of wrongdoing, there is nothing for which the actor
can be held responsible, and no issue, therefore, to which an excuse could possibly have
any sensible application.” (citing George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98
HARV. L. REV. 949, 960 (1985))).
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other words, should not be accorded total, lexical priority over all
other values identified in Wilkes.
Without overturning existing case law, the Massachusetts Su
preme Judicial Court could clarify that shareholder expectations
analysis is a threshold but non-dispositive inquiry.197 If the minor
ity shareholders can establish a particular expectation, then that ex
pectation should only be defeasible upon a very strong showing of
business need.198 However, if the minority shareholders have no
relevant expectation, then a correspondingly weaker business pur
pose would suffice.199 Viewed this way, shareholder expectations
analysis would neither be separate from the Wilkes test nor a re
placement for it.
CONCLUSION
Imagine if Justice Cardozo had issued a second opinion for the
New York Court of Appeals to explain what he meant when he
stated in Meinhard v. Salmon that fiduciary duty demands the
“punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”200 If Cardozo had writ
ten a companion decision describing what the “punctilio” requires,
and demystifying Meinhard’s other rhetorical chestnuts,201 we
might have something like the relation of Donahue and Wilkes—
the spiritual leader and the pragmatic acolyte.
Yet, as this Article has demonstrated, pragmatism is hard won.
The Wilkes test does not clarify Donahue so much as it raises new
questions. Viewed skeptically, Massachusetts’ fiduciary standard
contains many strands and offers support for almost any result.
There is, however, no reason to doubt the sincerity with which Mas
sachusetts courts have applied the Wilkes standard or that the
courts believe that they are doing anything other than resolving
197. This diaphanous approach would help clarify the relationship of reasonable
expectations and the Wilkes test as discussed supra Part III.C.
198. To be clear, I am not referring to explicit contractual arrangements, which
would still be enforced subject to any equitable exceptions that might apply within con
tract law.
199. For instance, if second or third generation shareholders who had never
worked for the business applied for a management position, the majority would need
little reason to decline.
200. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
201. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Story of Meinhard v. Salmon: Fiduciary
Duty’s Punctilio, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES, supra note 65, at 106, 120 (“The opinion
is one of Cardozo’s most eloquent. He paints with a broad brush, setting out high moral
aspirations.”).
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shareholder oppression cases consistent with a principled view of
fiduciary duty.
If Massachusetts’ explication of the fiduciary approach appears
to have serious shortcomings that can be traced back to Wilkes, it
suggests that we either need a different approach to the problem of
shareholder oppression or another way of understanding the work
that courts do in these kinds of cases. Perhaps fiduciary duty in
Justice Cardozo’s grand style is too lofty and we should fix our gaze
on something closer to home and more attainable, like an under
standing of the parties’ bargain rooted in relational contract theory.
Or perhaps a non-reductive approach to minority-shareholder op
pression will necessarily include a number of values that are in ten
sion with one another, that cannot be arranged into a final
framework, and that can only be adjusted case by case.

